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DO MANDATORY DRUG TESTS INVADE AN
EMPLOYEE'S PRIVACY?
Philip J. Griego*
INTRODUCTION: A QUESTION OF BALANCE
You are the plant manager for a Silicon Valley production fa-
cility. You employ about 1500 people. Your security department
has just informed you that they have unconfirmed reports of heavy
drug use in one of your quality control departments. They insist the
only expeditious way to weed out the bad apples and maintain a low
profile is to require every employee to undergo drug testing. Those
who refuse will be subject to immediate termination. You call your
legal counsel for an opinion. He is uneasy about the situation but
tells you there is no California case law directly addressing the is-
sue. A decision has to be made today. You are aware that the com-
pany has been threatened with a number of law suits involving
employee privacy in the recent past. Does the testing program vio-
late the employees' privacy? Is the company exposing itself to pos-
sible law suits if it terminates someone for refusing the test? Recent
decisions in California indicate that the answer to both these ques-
tions is YES!
In the recer~t case Long Beach City Employees Association v.
City of Long Beach,1 Justice Broussard, writing for a majority of the
California Supreme Court, decided that polygraph examinations
"inherently intrude upon the constitutionally protected zone of in-
dividual privacy."2  The reasoning of this decision makes it clear
that if the court finds polygraphs to be inherently intrusive on the
employees' right to privacy they will certainly find drug tests to be
an even greater intrusion.
The court premised its argument on the ability of the poly-
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Jose, California. A native of St. Louis, Missouri and raised in the aerospace environment of
the Mojave Desert, he moved to the Santa Clara Valley to complete his undergraduate work
at San Jose State University. He undertook the study of Law at Santa Clara University and
received his degree in 1977. Throughout his legal career he has studied the issues of employ-
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cludes work in trade secret and commercial litigation, collective bargaining rights and the
emerging right of due process in private employment.
1. 41 Cal. 3d 937 (1986).
2. Id. at 948.
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graph to record emotional responses through physiological
processes without any choice on the part of the employee. The key
word here is physiological. The reasoning of the case suggests that
the rule will not be limited to those tests which measure a person's
physiological responses to questions and will extend to those more
intrusive tests of a person's blood or urine.
The Polygraph device measures the examinee's psychologi-
cal response by monitoring physiological functions even when
she has chosen not to respond verbally to an intrusive question.
This method of interrogation robs the individual of her ability to
choose which thoughts will be communicated to others and
which will not.
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of this type of interroga-
tion is the coercive atmosphere that attends the administration of
the test. In situations like the present case, employees must di-
vulge private information or risk losing their jobs.3
Although the case concerns public employees, there is every
reason to believe that private employees hold the same inalienable
right to protection from the intrusive inquiries of their employers
and that they cannot be discharged for exercising that right.4
In the case of Virginia Rulon-Miller v. International Business
Machines Corporation,5 for example, the court considered the termi-
nation of an employee for her decision to continue dating a man
who worked for a competitor. The court noted the company's long
standing policy guaranteeing the employees' privacy. IBM had vio-
lated that policy when it fired her for not arranging her private life
according to the dictates of certain IBM managers. But more im-
portantly, the court recognized that a private employer can run
afoul of California's constitutional guarantee of privacy.6
In this case, there is a close question of whether those rules or
regulations permit IBM to inquire into the purely personal life of
the employee. If so, an attendant question is whether such a pol-
icy was applied consistently, particularly as between men and
women. The distinction is important because the right of privacy,
a constitutional right in California, [citations omitted], could be
3. Id. at 958, (concurring opinion by Bird C.J.).
4. Garrett v. Los Angeles City Unified School Dist. 116 Cal. App. 3d 472, 473 (1981),
held that the school district could require x-rays from prospective teachers as a precaution
against tuberculosis. But a comparison between the two reveals that the opinion may no
longer be good law in light of Long Beach.
5. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
6. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the California Constitution guar-
antees this right, as do those of Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Massachusetts, Montana and
Rhode Island.
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implicated by the. IBM inquiry. [emphasis added].7
Apparently the "purely personal lives" of employees are off-
limits to an employer's inquiry.8 Any incursion into individual pri-
vacy must be justified by a "compelling interest."9 California's con-
stitutional provision creates a civil right to privacy enforceable by
any aggrieved individual. 10 Thus, the right to privacy acts not only
as a shield for an employee who wishes to avoid intrusions into his
body but also as a sword subjecting the employer to an independent
source of liability regardless of the decision on whether to terminate
for refusing a test. For instance, a San Francisco Superior Court
ruled in Lueck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., October 27,
1987, that Southern Pacific's drug testing program does not violate
its employees' constitutional rights to privacy. But, it also ruled one
former employee's rights were violated if testing her was not neces-
sary to ensure the public's safety. The court ruled there is a com-
pelling state interest to ensure public safety which takes precedence
over any right to privacy. "But there is a question of whether a
person with the duties of the plaintiff should be tested to serve those
compelling interests." The plaintiff was a computer programmer.
The court held that this was a question for the jury, which awarded
plaintiff $485,042 in damages.
Drug or alcohol use, whether on or off duty, can, although will
not necessarily, affect the way an employee performs at work. If the
employee's work is affected then the drug use is not "purely per-
sonal.""2 Drug testing is the most problematic area of privacy
rights because it requires consideration and balancing of two impor-
tant interests: the right to be let alone and the right to a safe and
productive work environment. The issue arises because it is almost
universally recognized that drug testing, by its natute, is a form of
surveillance as intrusive as placing an agent of the employer in the
employees home. Testing reveals details about the employees' pri-
7. 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 248, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 530 (1984) (citing City and County
of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App. 3d 879, 883, 178 Cal. Rptr. 435.
8. See Adams & Reuners, 2 S. C. COMp. & H. TECH L. J. 305, 322 n.71 (1986).
9. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 104
(1975).
10. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr.
839, 843 (1976).
11. Lueck v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., (S.F. Superior Ct. Case No. 843220).
12. It should be noted that even a single marijuana cigarette has seriously impairing
effects on airline pilots for up to twenty-four hours after ingestion, even when the subject has
no subjective feeling of intoxication. Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hollister, Carry-Over Effects
of Marijuana Intoxication on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A Preliminary Report, AM. J. PsY-
CHIATRY, 1325, (1985).
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vate lives which they cannot choose to withhold. It is presumed
that the right of privacy is sufficiently important to be protected
absent compelling reasons for the intrusion. The arguments sur-
rounding drug testing center on the circumstances and reasons
compelling the particular testing scenario.
Courts in New York and New Orleans recently held that drug
tests without probable suspicion were an unconstitutional violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Similarly, a labor arbitrator ruled that
requiring a test without probable cause was an invasion of privacy,
and reinstated a union employee fired for refusing the test.1 3  These
cases follow Jones v. McKenzie; 4 Capua v. City of Plainfield;"s and
Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education,16
all of which favor the rights of employees. California Appellate de-
cisions already suggest looking to arbitration decisions as an aid to
courts who are called upon to define the growing area of private
employee rights.17
The testing issue is most likely to arise in three ways: at pre-
employment physical examinations, at regular annual physical ex-
aminations, and at random testing. Examination of the cases which
have dealt with this issue so far reveal a predictable trend which
managers can use as a guide to evaluate any testing program they
may be asked to consider.
Both pre-employment and routine annual physicals will be
governed by a rule similar to that in Jones v. McKenzie:18 (1) The
employee's duties must have a direct impact upon public safety; (2)
the medical examination must be routine and across the board; and
(3) the test must actually test for drug use, possession or intoxica-
tion at the time of the test or at the time the employee would be at
work.
Random sampling simply will not be tolerated unless the Jones
v. McKenzie tests are met. Individual testing will have to be based
upon individualized suspicion due to a reasonable belief that a per-
son is so impaired by drugs or alcohol that his condition directly
affects his job performance or he presents a clear and present danger
to himself, his co-workers or members of the public.
Although there is no privacy right to ingest illegal drugs in the
13. Teamsters Local 957 v. Gem City Chemicals, Inc. FMCS, 86 K/03576 (March 26,
1986).
14. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D. D.C. 1986).
15. 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D. N.J. 1986).
16. 119 A.D.2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup Ct. App. Div. 1986).
17. Pugh v. See's Candies Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, n.26, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
18. 2 IER 1121 (CA DC 1987).
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privacy of your own home,19 the right to be secure in your "purely
personal life" must, of necessity, include the right to engage in some
criminal activity without regulation by your employer. Lest this be
misconstrued as a blanket approval of off-duty illegal activity, we
should be reminded that our concern is not with the issue of
whether illegal activity has taken place at all. Rather, we are con-
cerned with the question of whether employers will be allowed to
gather evidence of such wrongdoing and what means they will be
allowed to use. Criminal activity should not be condoned. How-
ever, it is neither politically nor socially desirable that random
searches of individuals be allowed on the theory that it would deter
crime. The lose of liberty would far outweigh the benefit acheived
in reducing criminal activity or obtaining safer workplaces.
In some cases employees will have observable signs of intoxica-
tion or drug abuse which would provide probable cause for disci-
pline without the use of drug testing. Likewise, where drug or
alcohol use lead to poor performance on the job, drug testing is
unnecessary to provide a reason for termination even in those envi-
roriments where the employee is protected from arbitrary discharge
by contract, company policy or statute. This less intrusive means of
protecting the private employers' interests may be mandated by the
very nature of the individual privacy interests at stake. Cases in
other jurisdictions already follow the " legitimate interest test" to
balance the rights of the individual against the interests of the em-
ployer in drug testing cases.2' The analysis roughly follows the
''compelling state interest test' familiar to constitutional lawyers.
Some courts have upheld mandatory drug testing in the public
employment sector where the danger to public safety is seen as suffi-
ciently compelling to restrict the expectation of privacy of individ-
ual employees. Private employers will no doubt direct the courts'
attention to those cases as legal support for their own drug testing
programs. The range of responses include three basic tests: 1) the
compelling interest test, 2) the probable cause test and 3) the rea-
sonable suspicion test.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, for instance, in
applying the compelling interest test ruled that a police department
drug testing program which required police officers to submit to
urinalysis if suspected of drug use did not violate the Fourth
19. People v. Davis, 92 Cal. App. 3d 250, 260-61, 154 Cal. Rptr. 817, 823 (1979).
20. See Caruso v. Ward, 133 Misc. 2d 544, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1986); Treasury Employ-
ees v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986).
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Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. 2' The
police department's program provided that an employee who re-
fused to undergo testing, or whose test results were positive, was
subject to termination. The court decided that police officers have
less of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" with respect to drug
testing than ordinary citizens because the police department is a
para-military organization and there is a paramount public interest
in assuring that police officers are fit to perform their duties. Fur-
ther, the court determined that because of the nature of police work
and the fact that not only the employee's life but the lives of the
public rest upon the employee's alertness, the department's program
was justified.
The fundamental issue raised by all the discussion over drug
testing is who has the burden of proof? Will employers have to
justify the intrusion by some compelling interest or will the test be
presumed legitimate unless the employee demonstrates some reason
to doubt the test's reliability. In other words, will the employer be
able to test first and ask questions later? The answer to that ques-
tion depends upon one's philosophy of the dignity of man and one's
definition of liberty.
We could resolve the privacy issue simply by lowering the ex-
pectations of privacy. It has been suggested,22 that posting a rule
that employees will be subject to random searches would remove
any subjective expectation of privacy. Imagine the outcry if the po-
lice announced that they would hereafter search any house at ran-
dom. This would certainly lower our expectation of privacy but it
would hardly be an acceptable social answer because we believe our
privacy is entitled to protection regardless of any particular individ-
ual's subjective expectations. Our responses to the privacy issues
inherent in drug testing depend in large part on our formulation of
the question concerning privacy and our notions of the nature of
privacy. In other words, the right to privacy has not been, nor can
it ever be, completely and fully defined. In the process of answering
the question about drug testing, we are, in a very fundamental
sense, creating and defining it on an ad hoc basis. Seen in this way,
the question is not so much whether privacy rights protect employ-
ees from random drug tests as it is whether we wish to tolerate such
intrusion.
This work is a survey of the various approaches used by public
and private laws systems, including arbitration decisions, to address
21. Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005 (1985).
22. Adams & Remmers, supra note 8, at 327.
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the problem of balancing the interests of individual privacy against
the interests of the employer and the public in a safe and efficient
work place. It will also examine the approaches taken in those lo-
cal, state and federal jurisdictions that have, or are about to have,
legislation in the area. It will only briefly examine those areas so
highly regulated that they are considered subject to administrative
searches with little or no cause other than a legitimate and reason-
able regulatory scheme. This examination will provide some gui-
dance to those managers who have to make the day-to-day decisions
that may affect so many lives.
II. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, PUBLIC INTEREST AND
PROBABLE CAUSE
The decisions in these areas seem to require some probable
cause before the intrusion is allowed. However, one should con-
sider whether there are positions which so affect the public interest
that we cannot afford to wait until objective signs of drug or alcohol
abuse surface in order to take action. Positions such as airline pilots
or nuclear waste handlers immediately come to mind.
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia for
example dismissed claims of employees of the Washington Metro-
politan Transit Area Authority who were fired when blood and
urine tests disclosed the presence of drugs or alcohol. The court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the testing violated their rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, their right
of privacy, the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and the Civil Rights Act of
1871 holding that the Authority's actions were clearly in the pub-
lic's interest.
The recent decision by the Ninth Circuit in Railway Labor Ex-
ecutives' Association v. Burnley23 adds to the trend of decisions
which requires some probable cause before an intrusion is allowed.
Various railway labor organizations challenged the constitutionality
of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) regulations mandat-
ing blood and urine tests after certain train accidents and fatal inci-
dents and authorizing breath and urine tests of all employees
involved, after certain incidents, accidents and rule violations.24
The court noted that drug and alcohol tests of railway employ-
ees are searches.2" It then declared that a railway employee has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the personal information con-
23. - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1988), 88 C.D.O.S. 983 (9th Cir., Feb. 11, 1988.)
24. 49 C.F.R. SS219 (1986).
25. Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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tained in his blood, urine or breath. The majority therefore con-
cluded that the tests mandated by 49 C.F.R. § 219.203 are searches
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. The court held that
the government's action in authorizing the testing provisions was
sufficient government action for the purposes of a constitutional
challenge to the law.26
The court held that drug and alcohol testing could be con-
ducted without a warrant but, it specifically distinguished this case
from the class of cases falling under the administrative search ex-
ception. This exception holds that warrant and probable cause re-
quirements which fulfill the traditional Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness have a lessened application in the con-
text of a closely regulated industry because the owner or operator of
commercial premises in such an industry has a reduced expectation
of privacy.27  The majority distinguished those cases on the
grounds that they have authorized warrantless searches of property
not of persons.28 Despite the fact railroad industry has experienced
a long history of close regulation, the court held this regulation has
only diminished the owners' and managers' expectations of privacy
in railroad premises but it did not diminish the railroad employee's
expectation of privacy in his person or his body fluids.29
The court emphasized the point to distinguish Shoemaker v.
Handel,3° in which the third circuit held the administrative search
exception applies to warrantless breath and urine testing of jockeys
in the heavily regulated horse-racing industry. Critical to the Shoe-
maker decision analysis was the fact that jockeys, as the persons
engaged in the regulated activity, are the principle regulatory con-
cern.3 1 In contrast, the extensive regulation of the railroad industry
is designed to guarantee the safety of employees and the public and
to that end has always been geared to assuring the safety and
proper maintenance of equipment and facilities.
Accordingly, the court addressed what standard governs the
26. The court relied upon United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (1987), which involved
airport security searches by private airline employees. The Davis court stated the test for
whether there was government action "is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the
total enterprise of securing and selecting evidence .... " After reviewing the development of
a nationwide anti-hijacking program conceived and implemented by federal officials in coop-
eration with air carriers, the court concluded the government's role in the search program
had been a dominant one. Burnley at 985.
27. New York v. Burger 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
28. Burnley at 986.
29. Id. at 986.
30. 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
31. Burnley at 986.
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inquiry into the reasonableness of the drug testing regulations
aimed it railway employees. The majority took a two-step ap-
proach. To be reasonable the court must first determine that the
search was justified at the inception, and second, that it reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.
In the first prong of the test the court held that particularized
suspicion is essential to finding toxicological tests of railroad em-
ployees justified at its inception. The court explained this standard
requires reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn up
evidence that the employee has violated the industry rule and fed-
eral regulation prohibiting possession of alcohol and controlled sub-
stances.32 The majority concluded that "accidents, incidents or rule
violations by themselves, do not create reasonable grounds for sus-
pecting that tests will demonstrate alcohol or drug impairment...
in any one railroad employee, much less an entire train crew."33 In
order to meet the standard set out, the court stated the government
should incorporate a requirement of individual suspicion into the
mandatory test provision set out in 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.301 (b)(1) and
(c)(2), in order to comport with the great weight of authority hold-
ing a warrantless search of a person unconstitutional without a de-
gree of suspicion.34
In the second prong of its analysis the court found the regula-
tions were not sufficiently related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place. It declared that
blood and urine tests intended to establish drug use other than alco-
hol are not reasonably related to the stated purpose of the regula-
tions because these tests cannot measure current drug intoxication
or the degree of impairment.3" Thus by requiring individual suspi-
cion, the majority stated it would help alleviate some of the harsh
consequences of exclusive reliance on test results.
The court distinguished some conflicting authority relied on
by the FRA. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
36
approved a plan for testing custom officials seeking job transfers
with the Drug Enforcement Agency. The Railway majority did not
express any opinion as to the constitutionality of the program in
32. Id. at 987.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 988; 49 C.F.R. §§ 219.301(b)(1), (c)(2).
35. Id., citing Joseph, 4th Amendment Implications of Public Sector Work Place Drug
Testing, I 1 NOVA L. REv. 605, 632 (1987).
36. 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
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Von Raab, 7 rather it stated it did not find the case relevant because
the court failed to make the threshold determination whether the
search was justified at the inception. The court gave the same justifi-
cation to distinguish McDonell v. Hunter,"8 and Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy.3 9 McDonell upheld as reasonable the uni-
form or systematic drug testing of prison guards. Suscy held that
bus operators have no reasonable expectation of privacy and that
even if they did, the tests given were reasonable because they were
given only to operating employees directly involved in serious acci-
dents or suspected by two supervisory employees of being under the
influence.
The dissent in Burnley disagreed with the majority's distinction
of Shoemaker, pointing out that the government has a long history
of regulating the conduct of railroad employees to promote public
safety.' Relying on the administrative search exception, the opin-
ion argues further that the requirement of a warrant and probable
cause is not necessary to uphold the government's regulations re-
quiring drug testing. The dissent would hold that blood and urine
tests required by the regulations are justified at the inception. De-
spite the intrusion into an employee's privacy, the dissent argues
that the government's compelling need to assure railroad safety by
controlling drug use among railway personnel outweighs the need
to protect privacy interests.4 '
The rule developed in the majority opinion in Burnley adopts
the appropriate approach to the drug testing issue. The Ninth Cir-
cuit decision brings the area of employment drug testing into con-
junction with general search and seizure law. Rather than focusing
on how the government or company's compelling interests serve in
a vacuum, or carving out special privacy rules in the labor context,
the court applies the same analysis found in search and seizure
cases. Certainly this approach better serves the interest of public
safety than allowing random tests. By requiring particularized sus-
picion, the tests will be aimed directly at those most likely to harm
the public safety. Particularized suspicion provides objective in-
dicators for determining whether the testing program addresses a
compelling interest. Restricting intrusion to areas where there is a
strong likelihood of uncovering something, is similar to requiring a
37. - F.2d - (9th Cir. 1988).
38. 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
39. 538 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
40. Burnley, at 990.
41. Id. at 992.
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reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed in stop
searches. Our system of justice requires that no one be subject to a
warrantless search without reason and the same standard should
apply in the employment arena.
Random searching or drug testing after an accident or rule vio-
lation does not necessarily serve the purpose of the search, for the
search is intended to turn up information that the employee has
violated industry and federal prohibitions against possession or use
of alcohol and controlled substances on the job. For example, ran-
dom testing of an entire train crew after an accident is completely
beyond the scope of the regulation and only serves to invade the
privacy of many innocent employees in the interest of perhaps find-
ing one person who has worked under the influence of drugs or
alcohol.
Without objective indicators the court finds itself discussing
compelling interests in a vacuum. One could speculate how the in-
dividual's privacy could ever survive against such a broad compel-
ling interest as the protection of the public from the unsafe
operation of the railways. Particularized suspicion provides the
least restrictive means of serving the legitimate interest of providing
safe railways. In a broader context the particularized suspicion re-
quirement for testing may carry over into other work environment
issues such as AIDS testing for restaurant employees.
In American Federation of Government Employees v. Wein-
berger,42 however, a Georgia district court held that Defense De-
partment employees tests are an invasion of privacy and an
unreasonable search. According to the court:
[T]hese tests enable the individual or organization administering
them to monitor the off-duty conduct of employees, and repre-
sent a technological advance that must be cautiously examined
and which, if overzealously implemented, could threaten much
of the privacy most citizens now take for granted.
[T]he very taking of the sample makes for a quite substantial
intrusion that could not be negated even if an employee were
allowed to produce his urine sample in the privacy of an execu-
tive washroom, with no observation whatsover." 43
The government argued that the testing program was justified be-
cause drug use, on or off duty, was incompatible with government
employment. Said the court,
42. 651 F. Supp 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
43. Id. at 732, 734.
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[t]he government has cited a great many cases supporting this
position, and the Court does not take issue with it. The question
here, however, is not whether drug use, off-duty or on-duty is
incompatible with federal employment. Rather the question is
by what means is it permissible to come by evidence of such drug
use.
44
In other words the testing program itself was more deplorable than
the use of drugs by government employees.
President Reagan signed Executive Order 12,5644' which re-
quires all federal agencies to develop a program for the detection
and rehabilitation of alcohol and drug abusers employed by the fed-
eral government. The agencies are required, as part of the program,
to establish a test for the the use of illegal drugs, the criteria to be
determined by each agency, based upon the nature of the agency's
mission and its employees' duties, the efficient use of agency re-
sources, and the danger to the public health and safety or national
security that could result from the failure of an employee ade-
quately to discharge his or her duty. Since there are no specifics,
the legality of the individual testing schemes will have to be tested.
The Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration
of the Department of Health and Human Services issued Scientific
and Technical Guidelines for Drug Testing Programs on February
13, 1987. The guidelines cover the types of drugs to be tested and
the methods to be used, qualifications of testing and records keeping
personnel, and quality assurance procedures.
There is some doubt as to whether the California Supreme
Court would even follow the reasoning of other jurisdictions in light
of their ruling in Long Beach, a public employment case. While
public employment cases may help delineate the constitutional is-
sues involved, they are not directly applicable to private employ-
ment precisely because the private employee, as an "ordinary
citizen," does have a heightened expectation of privacy. Maryland's
Attorney General seemed to follow the California reasoning regard-
ing public employees, when it issued an opinion that mandatory
testing of
most categories of State employees would violate the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The testing of such an employee is permissible only if
based upon particularized probable cause, the traditional prereq-
uisite to a search or seizure. In addition, termination of an em-
44. Id. at 735.
45. 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889 (1986).
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ployee solely because the testing indicates current drug abuse
would violate the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973.46
The attorney general would allow testing of employees whose jobs
are directly related to public safety where circumstances give the
employer a reasonable objective basis to suspect illicit drug use.
Applicants could only be tested if drug abuse would present a dan-
ger to the public or to property.47
III. STATE AND LOCAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT: PROBABLE CAUSE OR
REASONABLE SusPIcIoN?
Connecticut allows testing only if the employer "has reason-
able suspicion to believe an employee's faculties are being impaired
on the job, and that his impairment presents a "clear and present
danger" to physical safety in the workplace. Any aggreived person
may sue for damages, attorney's fees and injunctive relief.4 s
In Iowa, employers may not test employees unless the em-
ployer has probable cause to believe the employee's faculties are im-
paired on the job and the employee holds a position that could
present a danger to public safety, the safety of himself, or another
employee, the safety of the employer's property, or where impair-
ment violates a known rule. The employer must provide substance
abuse treatment if recommended and may not discipline an em-
ployee for a first offense. He may, however, discipline an employee
who fails or refuses to complete a drug abuse program or tests posi-
tive a second time during the program period. A drug test may be
part of pre-employment screening if the application for employment
clearly gives the prospective employee notice that a test may be
required.49
The Minnesota Legislature has approved a drug testing pro-
gram limiting random testing to workers in "safety-sensitive" posi-
tions, which is a job, "including any supervisory or management
position in which an impairment caused by drug or alcohol usage
would threaten the health or safety of any person." Employees may
be tested if there is a reasonable suspicion that the employee is
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or if the employee violated
a written work rule on drugs on the job or has caused an accident or
injury, during annual physicals provided they are given two-weeks'
46. 71 Op. Att'y Gen No. 86-055 (Oct. 22, 1986).
47. Id.
48. Act of July 6, 1987, P.A. 551, § 6,1987 Conn. Legis. Serv. 500, 502 (West).
49. Act of June 5, 1987, H.F. 469, §§ 3, 7, 1987 Iowa Legis. Serv. 132, 133-135 (West).
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notice. The employer may take no disciplinary action against an
employee without offering the employee an opportunity to partici-
pate in a drug or alcohol rehabilitation program. However, he may
do so if the employee has refused to undertake or failed such a pro-
gram. Any employee may bring an action for damages and attor-
neys fees against any employer who violates the act.5
The City of Raleigh, North Carolina, will screen applicants for
health and safety positions, and those who test positive will not be
considered. Those employees who refuse the test will be dis-
charged. However, the city will not randomly test for other posi-
tions."' In South Carolina, aircraft crew members can be tested at
any time and will violate the state's drug testing law if they work
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 2
The San Francisco drug testing ordinance, effective December
1985, prohibits employers from requiring employees to take blood,
urine or encephalographic tests as a condition of continued employ-
ment unless there are reasonable grounds to believe an employee's
faculties are impaired and that "such impairment presents a clear
and present danger to the physical safety of the employee, another
employee or to a member of the public."' 53 Employers are further
required to give the employee tested the opportunity to have sam-
ples re-tested, at the employer's expense, at state licensed independ-
ent laboratories and to rebut the findings. Random sampling is
expressly prohibited. 54 An employer who violates the ordinance
may be sued and have its testing program enjoined by the court.
The aggrieved party is entitled to attorney's fees and the burden is
on the employer to prove that the testing complies with the
ordinance.55
At the other extreme, however, is Utah's statute, which allows
drug testing by employers and is rather broad in its terms: "It is
not unlawful for an employer to test employees or prospective em-
ployees for the presence of drugs or alcohol, in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter, as a condition of hiring or continued em-
ployment."'56 Under the Utah Code an employer may require any
employee to identify himself and give a sample; the employer may
50. MINN. STAT. ANN'. §§ 181.950-181, 957 (West Supp. 1985).
51. INDIV. EMPL. RTs. MAN. (BNA) 540:6 (Jan. 6, 1987).
52. Id. at 540:7.
53. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 527-85, art. 33A, s 3300A.5 amending pt. II, ch.
VIII POLICE CODE (1985).
54. Id.
55. Id. at §§ 3300A.5, 3300A.8.
56. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-38-3 (Supp. 1987).
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chose the" type of sample to be used.57
The Utah employer in these instances does not need probable
cause to conduct a test or request a sample. Positive test results or
refusal to take the test allows an employer to terminate the em-
ployee, require that the employee enroll in a drug rehabilitation
program, or engage any other disciplinary action consistent with
the employer's general policy. There is a rebuttable presumption
that the test is valid if the statute is complied with, and no cause of
action for defamation arises unless the test results are false AND
the results are disclosed, with malice to a person other than the
employer or agent of the employer.59
In a 1987 opinion, Virginia's Attorney General stated that "[ilt
is clear that the balance of interests in most work situations requires
that drug testing be conducted only on the basis of at least 'reason-
able suspicion.' [citations omitted]. Therefore, it is my opinion that
random drug testing is not permissible in most work settings, in-
cluding public safety occupations." 6 The opinion notes that the
only cases where the testing has been upheld have been under the
administrative search doctrine for a highly regulated industry, like
horseracing, where the regulation gives the employee a reasonable
expectation that he will be subject to a search at any time. This,
notes the opinion, is different from most employment situations.6 x
Washington D.C. passed HB 1063 which allows testing only
when there are "reasonable grounds" set forth in writing to believe
the employee's job performance has been affected by drugs. It
passed the Labor Committee on March 6, 1987.
The California Senate's Industrial Relations Committee re-
cently stalled a bill to allow employers to conduct drug testing of
employees based on "reasonable suspicion" of drug or alcohol im-
pairment. The bill will be reconsidered in 1988, according to a
spokesperson for the sponsor, state Senator John Seymour (R). The
bill defines "reasonable suspicion" as "a belief based on facts suffi-
cient to lead a reasonable person to suspect that the employee is
under the influence of drugs or alcohol."' 62 The bill does not pro-
vide specific examples of what might be considered sufficient evi-
dence and leaves that question up to employers and, ultimately, the
courts. However, it is well-established that intoxication is within
57. Id. at § 34-384.
58. Id. at § 34-38-8.
59. Id. at §§ 34-38-10, 34-38-11.
60. Reprinted in, [Vol. B] Indiv. Empl. Rts. Man. (BNA) 589:3, 4 (Feb. 27, 1987).
61. Id. at 589:3.
62. SB 1611, - Leg., - Sess., 1987 Cal. Stat. -.
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the common experience of most citizens so that a lay person's opin-
ion is credible evidence on this point. Such characteristics as blood-
shot or watery eyes, odor of alcoholic beverage on the breath, insta-
bility in the walk or stance, swaying, slurred or slowed speech, or
any other characteristic which exhibits a change in the person's or-
dinary demeanor, could be interpreted as signs of intoxication. The
bill provides for confidentiality of test results, independent confir-
mation of the tests and guidelines for assuring the quality of the
testing procedure. Seymour's bill would supersede all local drug
testing laws such as the San Francisco Ordinance noted earlier. A
second Seymour bill will consider random sampling of safety-sensi-
tive jobs.
A similar bill introduced by Assemblyman Johan Klehs (AB
330) cleared the Assembly Labor and Employment Committee on
May 20, 1987. The bill establishes state licensing procedures for
laboratories that analyze drug test samples for employers. The
Ways and Means Committee considers the bill next. In 1986 Gov-
ernor George Deukmejian vetoed a similar bill. The bill would have
provided for confidentiality of test results, the right to copies of test
results, voluntary participation in rehabilitation programs, and the
retention of samples for ninety days.
IV. ARBITRATION CASES
Arbitrators apply a variety of tests drawing upon civil and
criminal standards of privacy law. Some even recognize that the
employee's interest in privacy is worthy of at least some protection
as part of the "common law" of the workplace, independent of any
strict statutory or constitutional enactment.
Arbitrators do not uniformally adopt public law standards for
deciding search and test cases. This is because the interests of the
employer in a safe work place are not the same as the interests of
society in defining and controlling criminal behavior. Among the
employer's considerations is the
practical necessity of maintaining the safety and productivity of
the workplace. Viewed in this light, the issue is not whether
there is enough evidence to punish an individual but whether
there is a reasonable basis for taking preventive or protective
measures to maintain safety and productivity when these are
threatened by drugs. [I]n any event, in disciplinary arbitrations,
including those involving alcohol and drugs, what is generally at
issue is not employee 'fault' or 'innocence' but whether the em-
ployer had 'just cause.' The ultimate criterion remains: is the
arbitrator, who is presumed to be a rational and fair-minded
[Vol. 4
EMPLOYEE PRIVACY
decisionmaker, convinced that just cause existed under all the
facts and circumstances? If applied consistently, there is no rea-
son why that criterion should be insufficient to protect the griev-
ant, regardless of the odiousness of the alleged offense.63
A. Validity and Reasonableness of Workplace Searches
According to one arbitrator, "[e]mployees must be accorded
their right of privacy and there is no absolute right of an employer
to search personal effects."'  However, Denenberg asserts that the
doctrine gives way to a counterveiling principle: the legitimate need
of the employer to fully investigate allegations of breaches of the
rules. Many arbitrators have affirmed an employer's authority to
invade an employee's privacy by searching his person, personal
posessions or locker for contraband substances when an infraction
of plant rules is reported.6 5
Some arbitrators believe that if a police officer is justified in
searching a suspect [i.e., where probable cause exists], then an em-
ployer is justified in searching an employee for drugs or alcohol. In
one case a fifteen-day suspension was upheld for an employee who
refused to reveal whether he was carrying a liquor bottle. A witness
said he had seen the grievant drink from the bottle, stuff the bottle
under his sweater, and that he had alcohol on his breath. The union
claimed that the federal and state constitutions protect an individ-
ual in his privacy and such searches are not a condition of employ-
ment. The arbitrator held:
In criminal cases, an officer who has probable cause to be-
lieve a felony has been committed and probable cause to believe
that a specific individual committed such a felony may arrest the
individual and search him in connection with the arrest. There is
no constitutional protection against such a search.
It is quite inappropriate to attempt to establish an exact par-
allel between rights of citizens on the street and employees in the
plant. When employees take an employment, they do so subject
to normal restrictions inherent in a crowded industrial setting.
The right of Management to fairly operate its business without
undue impediment must be balanced against the right of the em-
ployees to continue to enjoy their civil rights to the fullest. How-
ever the two will clash and in the factual setting of this case, it is
63. T. DENENBERG & R. DENENBERG, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS: ISSUES IN THE WORK-
PLACE, 56-57 (1983) [hereinafter DENENBERG].
64. Comco Metal Products, Ltd. v. UAW Local 386, 58 Lab.Arb. (BNA) 279, 281
(1972) (Brown, Arb.).
65. DENENBERG, supra note 63, at 59.
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not inappropriate to treat a supervisor by analogy to a peace of-
ficer in the plant setting.
In this situation [the supervisor's] observations of Grievant
and detection of alcohol on his breath, are entirely credible ....
Therefore [the supervisor] had probable cause to believe that a
serious plant rule violation (here use of alcoholic beverage can be
viewed as the equivalent of an industrial felony) was being com-
mitted .... [A]n order to Grievant to unbutton his sweater...
was entirely supportable and within Management's prerogative
to maintain plant discipline.66
In a similar case:
The Union argue[d] with conviction that the Employer has
attempted in this case to place the burden on the employee of
proving his innocence, and that this is contrary to the traditions
of our society. Of course, in criminal proceedings the burden is
on the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the
accused is entitled to a presumption of innocence. But the limi-
tations imposed upon the state with respect to criminal punish-
ment are not applicable in any wholesale manner to disciplinary
action taken by an employer. The Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments do prevent a state from conducting unreasonable
searches and seizures, but this prohibition would not have direct
application to a private employer's demand that an employee
give an explanation of suspicious conduct occurring during
working hours and on company property ... . Moreover, the
facts... suggest that if [the supervisor] were a police officer he
would have been entitled to search [the grievant] without a
warrant.
Constitutional protections, therefore, do not shelter [the
grievant] from appropriate Employer discipline ....
In any event, this is not a case in which the Employer has
placed the original burden of proving innocence upon an accused
employee. This is instead a case in which the events observed by
[a supervisor] established a prima facie case that the employee
had engaged in conduct which justified discipline. In such a case
it is appropriate to place the burden upon the employee to rebut
the prima facie case by giving an explanation of his conduct and
demonstrating the fallacy or at least a weakness in the prima fa-
cie case. [The grievant] refused to do this, and the prima facie
case remained against him .... 6
66. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. UAW Local 272, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 702, 705 (1977)
(Casselman, Arb.).
67. Issacson Structural Co.v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental
Iron Workers, Local 506, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1075, 1078-1079 (1979) (Peck, Arb.).
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There are lessons to be drawn from these decisions. Arbitra-
tors were not considering situations where the right to privacy ap-
plied directly to employees as citizens of the state as would be the
case in California and several other states. The union was arguing
by analogy federal and state protections against intrusions from the
state, not from a private employer. Those situations are not directly
applicable here because, as we have already seen, the right to pri-
vacy in California applies directly to citizens and includes protec-
tion from intrusion from government and private entities such as
businesses and employers. Therefore, the analysis provided by these
decisions cannot be adopted wholecloth.
On the other hand they do recognize some interest in privacy
for they engage in a balancing act to justify the search or intrusion
in some way. They balance the interest in privacy against the inter-
est in the plant maintaining security, by the adoption of probable
cause and the burden of proof arising out of the managment estab-
lishing a prima facie case of possession or influence. The burden of
proof shifts to the employee to rebut the inferences legitimately
drawn by the evidence and the management has the right to make
the investigation. Refusal is insubordination.
However, again, none of these cases deal with situations of con-
sumption off duty, not affecting the work place, or wholesale ran-
dom samplings. The employee's increased expectation of privacy
off the employment premises, lacks the implied permission to sub-
mit to bodily intrusions that exists on the employment premises.
Can the employer reduce expectations of privacy by prior notice, by
developing a custom and practice, through a consistent pattern of
searches, by incrementally increasing that portion of the employees'
private lives that is open to employer scrutiny? In at least one case,
searches without the employees' permission were upheld.6"
B. The Validity of Collective Bargaining Agreements with
Provisions for Employee Drug Testing
Where the collective bargaining agreement provides for a blood
test, many arbitrators have construed that as a waiver of the em-
ployee's right to object to a search. As one arbitrator remarked,
"asking an employee to take a blood test is clearly as much for his
68. Smith's Food King v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 619, 625
(1976) (Ross, Arb.). Here the employer suspected that his employee was under the influence
of drugs, handcuffed him, and searched his person. While some might find this type of search
acceptable, what about a forced blood test, physically restraining the employee in order to
obtain it?
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protection as for the Company's."6 9 However, other arbitrators
have concluded that, even though a bargaining agreement or com-
pany policy mandates testing, no admission of guilt can be implied
from an employee's refusal to take a test.70
Nor do arbitrators uphold dismissals if there is any doubt as to
the integrity of the sample. This means that strict chain of custody
has to be established. Failure to follow the chain of custody proce-
dures in a collective bargaining agreement was sufficient to overturn
a five day suspension for being under the influence.71 Other arbitra-
tors have rejected this contention and presumed good faith unless
there is some evidence to suggest tampering.72
C. Objective Workplace Observations: Necessity and
Potential for Abuse
There are cases relying on the observations of lay witnesses to
establish intoxication in alcohol cases.73 This is not a universally
accepted principle among arbitrators.74 Some require blood tests,
while others rely on both blood tests and eye witness testimony.75 A
great body of arbitration decisions rely on both observable signs and
test results. 7
6
Discipline has been upheld relying entirely on subjective obser-
vations identifying marijuana by its odor and the ritualistic passing
of what appeared to be a "joint."77 However, two of the cases gave
diametrically opposed descriptions of what the smell was like. In
one case it was described as sweet and in the other it was described
as bitter.
Observations are not completely trustworthy. A survey of lab-
69. Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 993,
68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 421, 426 (1976) (Simon, Arb.).
70. See Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 788, 72 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 198 (1979) (Newmark, Arb.); Blue Diamond Co.v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
Local 557, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1136 (1976) (Summers, Arb.); Capital Area Transit Author-
ity v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1039, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 811, (1977) (Ellmann,
Arb.).
71. HolUston Mills, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 549, 60 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1030 (1973) (Simon, Arb.).
72. See Cessna Aircraft Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 1992, 52 Lab
Arb. (BNA) 764 (1979) (Altrock, Arb).
73. See DENENBERG, supra note 63, at 68.
74. Id. at 69.
75. See Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local
993, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 421 (1976) (Simon, Arb.).
76. DENENBERG, supra note 63, at 70-73; see also, Capital Area Transit Auth. v. Amal-
gamated Transit Union, Div. 1039, 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 811, 815 (1977) (Ellmann, Arb.).
77. DENENBERG, supra note 63, at 87-89.
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oratory analyses of street drugs, published in 1977, revealed that
only about half of the more than 6,000 samples tested contained
precisely the substance suspected; in some instances, the sample re-
vealed a different drug, the right drug plus other drugs, or no drug
at all.78
Is the employee impaired? What about over-the-counter drugs
that can be taken and are just as deleterious to a person's health as
controlled substances? Is the employee to be tested for all kinds of
medicine regardless of its legality? And if so how will impairment
be determined? If impairment can be determined by observable
signs then why do you need a drug test? Seventy-five percent of all
deaths attributed to drugs by medical examiners in 1980 were
linked to prescription drugs.79
Arbitrators who have considered the issue conclude that it
makes no difference whether the intoxicants are prescribed by a
doctor or bought on the street if being intoxicated at work violates
plant rules. One case considered the appearance of an employee
being in an intoxicated condition, speech slurred and thick-tongued.
He was sent home and ultimately discharged for violation of a plant
rule against "reporting to work under influence of intoxicants or
drugs." The Union defended the employee by attributing his condi-
tion to taking tranquilizers and a sleeping pill; both medications
prescribed for him by a doctor. The arbitrator upheld the discharge,
reasoning that no matter how the condition had been produced, the
testimony established a violation of the rule inasmuch as the griev-
ant was clearly unfit to work. 0
The difficulty with cases where there is no medical or scientific
evidence is illustrated by the case of the airline fRight attendant fired
for being intoxicated on the job. The arbitrator upheld the termina-
tion on the basis of witnesses' observations of her behavior:
Although, their words were not the same, the cumulative
impact of [the witnesses'] direct observations is overwhelming.
The grievant's eyes were described as droopy, glassy, blurry, wa-
tery, wandering unfocussed and vacant. Her speech was charac-
terized as slurred, confused, disjointed and incoherent. Her
motor functions were depicted as uncoordinated, unbalanced,
slow, wobbly, unsteady, unstable, stumbling and swaying ....
78. Perry, Street Drug Analysis and Drug Use Trends 1969-1975 (Part I),
PHARMCHEM NEWSLETrER (1977).
79. Abuse of Legal Drugs is Cited, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1982, at -, col. -.
80. Stokley-Van Camp, Inc. v. United Steelworkers Union, Local 6515, 64 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 859, 860-61 (1975) (Foster, Arb.). See also, United Parcel Sery. v. International Bhd.
of Teamsters, Local 988, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1069, 1072-73 (1979) (White, Arb.).
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Although I agree with the union that each of the incidents
of the grievant's work performance is insignificaift, if viewed sin-
gly and in isolation, taken together they provide cumulative evi-
dence that the grievant's conduct was indeed unusual and
abnormal, and could fairly be characterized as that of a drug-
intoxicated person.. . . I do not find that the company's case
must fail because of the absence of medical evidence in light of
the overwhelming nature of its proof, but I suggest that an effort
to obtain such evidence might be desirable in a case in which the
testimony of the disinterested lay witnesses is less convincing and
conclusive .... [The grievant] could not offer any credible evi-
dence to show that her condition was caused by any factor other
than intoxication. Her excuses concerning her fatigue, anxiety
and semi-comatose condition are simply insufficient to explain
her behavior and conduct.81
D. Reasonableness: The Proper Standard for Application or
an Ambiguous Standard Incapable of Objective
Determination.
The reasonableness of any rule mandating testing in part de-
pends upon the potential for danger or the possibility of impairment
which would have catastrophic effects on public safety, national se-
curity or the industry mission. Arbitrators are more likely to up-
hold a termination for a refusal to test where any impairment has
great potential for harm to life or property. For example, one arbi-
trator concluded that "in view of the fact that the facility . . . is
owned by the U.S. Government and engaged in making live ammu-
nition it must be concluded that the rule is reasonable if for no other
reason than the nature of the product."82
A similar conclusion was reached by an arbitrator upholding a
five-day suspension of a civilian employee for possession of mari-
juana at an Air Force base because "[t]he possibility of job impair-
ment and the increased risk to the safety of others is so readily
apparent in a situation where the Employer is servicing jet air-
craft.... 83
Arbitrators also weigh the possibility that a grievant's drug in-
volvement may be harmful to the reputation or integrity of the em-
81. United Airlines, Inc. and Ass'n of Flight Attendants, Board No. ORD 56-80 (Me-
kelvey, 1981).
82. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Interntional Chem. Workers Union, Local 526, 75
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 699, 701 (1980) (Sisk, Arb.).
83. Department of Air Force v. American Fed. of Gov't Employees, Local 1592, 72
Lab. Arb.(BNA) 1107, 1109 (1979) (Culley, Arb.).
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ployer. The discharge of a maintenance worker at a state university
who had been arrested for selling amphetamines to an undercover
detective on campus was upheld by an arbitrator who took note of
the sensitive position of a public institution of higher education:
In determining penalty, I cannot ignore the special responsi-
bility the State University has to its students and their parents.
The State is obligated to see that its campuses are not sanctuaries
for the drug trade. It is no secret that drugs are a problem on the
nation's campuses and on this one, in particular....
Allowing grievant's return to duty would have a negative
impact on the orderly operation of the university. It would send
the wrong message to the rest of its employees. [citation
omitted]8 4
Not all arbitrators are so willing to uphold discharges unless
the case for effect on the employer is compelling. A public utility
worker who sold amphetamines shortly before beginning his em-
ployment was discharged when he pleaded guilty to drug charges.
He was reinstated by an arbitrator, who reasoned:
[The grievant's] arrest and conviction carried over to the period
of his employment but those occurrences do not create a suffi-
cient link or connection between the illegal conduct and griev-
ant's job or the employer-employee relation. The employer's
evidence was less than substantial in showing a direct, damaging
impact on the manner in which [the grievant] did his work or on
the image or legitimate business interests of the company.
There is no question but that grievant's offense was both legally
and morally wrong but that was a concern for the civil authori-
ties. In the absence of evidence of a more direct, adverse impact
on grievant's job performance or damage to the company's image
or reputation for public service and integrity, or even the exist-
ence of a general drug problem among its employees, the dis-
charge cannot be sustained. In sum, the company's
understandable fears remained inchoate.85
E. The Inquiry into the Off-Duty Private Life of an
Employee: Employer Necessity vs. Employee Rights
Arbitrators are not inclined to uphold discipline for off-duty
84. State Univ. of New York v. Civil Svc. Employees Ass'n, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb.(BNA)
299, 301 (1980) (Babisun, Arb.).
85. Missouri Public Service Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 814, 70
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1208, 1210 (1978) (Yarowsky, Arb.).
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conduct unless there is clear notice in the contract.8 6 Consider the
case in which an employee was in an accident while driving under
the influence. At the time of his arrest the grievant was driving his
own vehicle, was on his own time and was not engaged in any busi-
ness of his employer. The arbitrator held:
[E]xceptions and extension of the employer's disciplinary
rights beyond the immediate employment relationship should be
expressly set forth in the contract and may not be deemed to
exist by implication. The conclusion is required that under the
contract language, the right to discipline for intoxication, neglect
of work or the violation of any acceptable factory rule is applica-
ble to an employee's conduct during his hours of work. It does
not seem reasonable that the parties intended that a factory rule
should extend so as to govern acts of intoxication while within
the privacy of the employee's home. (emphasis in original). 87
The doctrine against off-site regulation was best delineated in
this case:
While it is true that the employer does not [by virtue of the em-
ployment relationship] become the guardian of the employee's
every personal action and does not exercise parental control, it is
equally true that in those areas having to do with the employer's
business, the employer has the right to terminate the relationship
if the employee's wrongful actions injuriously affect the business.
The connection between the facts which occur and the ex-
tent to which the business is affected must be reasonable and dis-
cernible. They must be such as could logically be expected to
cause some result in the employer's affairs. Each case must be
measured on its own merits.88
In another case, however, an arbitrator upheld the discharge of
an employee for having been convicted of driving a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol. The company rules did not
mention off-duty drinking, but the arbitrator cited the rule against
"violation of criminal law" as one of the offenses that may lead to
dismissal:
[T]he factor which is most important in this case is that a Com-
pany rule was violated by the Grievant's conviction. This rule
states nothing about conduct on or off the premises but merely
86. General Tire Serv. v. General Truckdrivers, Local 980, 52 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1279,
1281 (1969) (Todd, Arb.).
87. Lamb Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, Local 99, 32 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 420,
424 (1959) (Dworkin, Arb.).
88. Inland Container Corp. v. United Paperworkers of Am., Local Nos. 31, 114, 993,
1046, & 4658, 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 312, 314 (1957) (Fergusun, Arb.).
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says violation of criminal law may be grounds for dismissal. The
Grievant's conduct came under this rule and the rule could be
applied by the Company unless it was unreasonable. The mere
fact that the rule was general and applied to conduct on and off
the premises would not of itself make it unreasonable. [citations
omitted] 9
An arbitrator upheld the discharge of an employee, on a tem-
porary assignment away from his home plant, who was involved in
two serious automobile accidents within a few days. In each in-
stance he was off-duty but driving a car his company had author-
ized him to rent. In both cases, the state police reported that the
grievant had been driving at an excessive speed and that his breath
smelled of alcohol. In one of the accidents, a fellow employee was
severely injured.
The arbitrator noted that the employer had posted a rule
prohibiting conduct "adversely affecting the interests or reputation
of the company." This prohibition applied to conduct "on com-
pany property and elsewhere." The arbitrator held:
The Union is ... correct when it asserts, as a general rule, that
the Company has no right to regulate or control the private lives
of its employees. However, this general rule is subject to an ex-
ception. Where the off-the-job conduct of an employee adversely
affects the interests or reputation of the Company, such conduct
may properly be prohibited. In the case of [the grievant], sub-
stantial evidence was produced by the Company demonstrating
that notoriety resulted from the two accidents. Publicity such as
this is particularly damaging to a Company attempting to estab-
lish a harmonious relationship within a rural area where it is the
largest single employer. There is no doubt in the mind of the
Arbitrator that the Company has a justifiable right in protecting
itself against such damage to its reputation .... It may well be
true that the Company has no prohibition against employees
drinking on their own time. Nevertheless, all employees of the
Company, if they intend to indulge themselves in this manner,
must do so under circumstances that will not harm the reputa-
tion of the Company.90
89. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 41 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1091,
1094 (1963) (Oppenheim, Arb.).
90. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 727, 37 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 906, 908 (1961) (Roberts, Arb.).
1988]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4WJOURNAL
F. Pre-employment Screening: A Viable Employer Method
for Meeting Potential Workplace Problems?
Disciplinary action taken on the basis of screening procedures
such as questionnaires in job applications has come under arbitral
scrutiny. In one case, the employee refused to answer this question:
"In the past three years, have you ever knowingly used any narcot-
ics, amphetamines or barbiturates, or any other controlled sub-
stances, other than those prescribed for you by a physician?" The
employer discharged him partly because of his failure to respond.
The discharge was upheld on other grounds but the arbitrator ruled
that the failure to answer, by itself, would not have merited such a
severe penalty. The arbitrator considered the fact that the em-
ployer's products are much sought after by criminal elements;
therefore, it requires daily efforts to constrict access to those who
would misuse them. With this concern in mind, the arbitrator fur-
ther reasoned:
The employer has a right to determine if an employee may
try to use its drugs himself, or if his access to drugs may be dan-
gerous to himself or his employer. So that seeking such informa-
tion.., is not an invasion of privacy.
That being the case, an employee could refuse to answer
such a question on the grounds that the answer might tend to
incriminate him. However, this is not to say that the Company
does not have the right to ask the question. It may. But it must
take whatever answer is given-even a plea that the answer might
be self-incriminating. 91
Thus, the arbitrator held that since the grievant refused to answer
the question, the employer was within its right to impose some form
of discipline. However, refusal to answer a question would not
alone justify discharge.
Some commentators believe that obtaining a consent form in
advance of hiring "increases the likelihood that the testing will not
be considered a violation of the applicant's privacy interests." 92
This is a questionable supposition. First of all, why should the
rights of an applicant be less or different than the rights of an em-
ployee? There is no rational basis for making such a distinction; if
there is a right of privacy, it is incident to the individual regardless
of status. The public sector employee cannot be compelled to give
up his rights in order to receive the benefit of public employment.
91. Rexall Drug Co. v. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers International Union, Local 5-
136, 65 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1101, 1103-1104 (1975) (Cohen, Arb.).
92. Adams & Remmers, supra note 8, at 311.
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Such a waiver is arguably obtained under threat of economic du-
ress-the exclusion from the class of eligible applicants.
V. THE QUESTION OF ACCURACY
Again, the justification presented by the employer is the center
of focus when a privacy challenge is asserted against the drug test.
Throughout the debate it should be remembered that employers
may still make relevant inquiries into the private activities of indi-
viduals which affect their performance on the job or which affect
employee morale. An employer would most certainly be entitled to
question employees about possible involvement in the use or sale of
narcotics on the job site in order to assure a safe and crime-free
work place. Such inquiries protect the employer from potential
criminal or civil liability. They would certainly be allowed to in-
quire as to private drug use to the extent it affected the employee's
job or endangered his or his co-workers' safety. However, these in-
quiries will probably be limited to verbal interrogation unless the
company can demonstrate that no other means is available to pro-
tect a critical and compelling interest of the employer associated
with a compelling public interest in safety or morals.
All this assumes that the testing procedure used by the em-
ployer presents accurate indications of drug -use. An excellent arti-
cle on this subject presents substantial evidence that some of the
procedures report false indications of drug use in up to twenty per-
cent of the cases. 93 One court went so far as to say that the drug
testing plan at issue was so unreliable as to violate due process of
law.94 In this case a declaration filed by the plaintiff's expert illus-
trates scientific concern over the accuracy of testing methods and
techniques:
All drug testing procedures result in false positives. The reliabil-
ity of all drug determinations, whether by immunoassay or GC/
MS, depend on such factors as the certainty of specimen identifi-
cation; specimen storage, handling, and preparation; preparation
and storage of test reagents; proper cleaning and calibration of
testing instruments and hardware; and the qualification and
training of laboratory personnel performing the test and inter-
preting the results. The danger of carelessness in test perform-
ance and/or inadequately trained personnel may be a particular
problem with immunoassays, which are popular for low-cost,
93. Rust, The Legal Dilemma, 72 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (Nov. 1, 1986).
94. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380, 389 (E.D. La.
1986).
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large-scale screening of many specimens with readily available
equipment and minimum personnel training. The problem, none-
theless, is also present when GC/MS is utilized.
95
One method used in drug detoxification clinics, for testing pa-
rolees and prison inmates and other large-scale screening programs,
is thin layer chromotography (TLC). TLC must be interpreted by a
skilled technician and, if used alone, can produce false positives. 96
Some immunoassay tests for cannabinoid may be too sensitive in
that they react positively to a sample from a person who has been
passively exposed to marijuana smoke.97 None of the procedures
actually test for impairment-the one factor that makes the inquiry
relevent for an employer mandated test.
Additionally, one commentator notes that as many as half of
the positive results in urine tests can be false positives based on a
manufacturer admitted five percent error factor. This does not con-
sider the attendant factors of poorly trained personnel, mis-
calibrated instruments and faulty test procedures.9"
One study reviewed urine toxicology from the College of
American Pathologists from 1984, 1985, 1986. Hundreds of labora-
tories participated in the proficiency programs under study.
Most disturbing of all, despite the fact that any positive result
must be confirmed by a technically different method as has been
standard operating procedure for many years for laboratory
personnel, false-positive reports of drugs like morphine, codeine,
cannibinoids, phencylidene, benzoylecgonine, secobarbital, and
amphetamines continue to appear in distressingly large
numbers.
99
No doubt the most accurate way of establishing that an em-
ployee is under the influence of drugs would be to perform a chemi-
cal test. However, unlike alcohol, for which there are standard
breath and urine tests, satisfactory tests for many drugs are not yet
available. There are laboratory procedures for detecting the pres-
ence in urine of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), the ingredient which
95. Id. at 390.
96. SMITH & WESSON, SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN INDUSTRY; IDENTIFICATION, INTER-
VENTION, TREATMENT AND PREVENTION, IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE,
(Smith, Wesson, Zerkin, & Novey eds., 1985), at 14.
97. Sedgewick, Cannibinoid Analysis: Problems and Interpretation, 14 PHARMCHEM
NEWSLETTER No. 1, (Jan/Feb, 1975).
98. Lyken, The Validity of Tests: Caveat Emptor, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 263, 265-266
(Spring 1987).
99. Lundberg, M.D., Mandatory Unindicated Urine Drug Screening: Still Chemical
McCarthyism, 24 IN BRIEF 10, 11.
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produces the effects associated with marijuana. But the test is too
sensitive to furnish useful evidence. In some instances, persons who
merely sat in the same vehicle as a marijuana smoker showed traces
of THC. Moreover, marijuana smoked weeks earlier may produce a
positive test result. Consequently, where an employee was alleged
to have used marijuana at work, or just before coming to work, even
a positive test result would be inconclusive.
Another complicating factor is the absence of an accepted
scale, comparable to the blood alcohol content level, for measuring
the effect of marijuana upon an individual. In a letter to the medi-
cal community in 1983, a group of toxicologists cautioned: "It is
impossible, at present, to establish by urine testing methods that the
person [who smoked marijuana] was adversely affected by the drug
.... [A] correlation between blood concentrations and possible im-
pairment has not yet been fully established."'"
VI. THE SOCIAL POLICY ISSUE
Aside from the question of accuracy there is also the attendant
issue of how much power employers will be given to regulate the
private lives of their employees. The more difficult question is
presented by the employer's rule that it will not tolerate any use of
drugs or alcohol by its work force regardless of whether it demon-
strably affects the employer's interests or not. The interests of soci-
ety in declaring certain private conduct criminal and attaching
criminal penalties to violations of those rules is a legitimate act pro-
tecting public health, safety and morals. However, those interests
are not necessarily the same as the interest of the private employer
nor do they derive from the same source. We ought not adopt a
policy that would encourage a private business to subject its em-
ployees to its own parochial view of public safety and morality. In
the one case the entire society acts through its legislature to accom-
modate the broader interests of society at large. No such demo-
cratic processes exist to temper the factional power of the employer
who, in a sense, would be acting as a surrogate police force without
the institutional safeguards that exist precisely to protect the indi-
vidual from the abuse of power.
The following is this author's attempt to synchronize the wide
variety of tests utilized across the land that have dealt with this
problem. In order to balance the counterveiling interests worthy of
protection, the following guidelines to aid the manager in deciding
100. Bray, Urine Testing for Marijuana Use, 249 J. A.M.A. 881 (Feb. 19, 1983).
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whether or not to adopt a testing program for the workplace are
proposed.
Random testing without evidence of specific impairment, be-
cause of its potential intrusion into the purely private lives of indi-
viduals, should not be conducted unless and until the employer can
demonstrate a compelling interest for the test. That interest could
be compelling where the risk of harm to life and property of the
general public is so clearly and pursuasively demonstrated as to jus-
tify this intrusion. Risk of injury to the individual, his co-workers,
or the reputation or property of the employer, is insufficient to jus-
tify random sampling because of the ease with which employers can
fashion an argument that the individual job poses a risk of harm to
others besides the offender. Furthermore, since the right to privacy
is a public right, it makes sense to condition an intrusion upon that
right with a demonstration of equally important public interests.
Those interests will not be present in most employment situations.
Specific testing of individuals can only be justified by a compel-
ling interest. In this context it could be presumed that the em-
ployer's interest in preventing drug use on the premises, is per se
compelling. We may also presume that off-duty drug use which en-
dangers the safety of the employee, his co-workers, or the em-
ployer's reputation or property, is also per se compelling. But
specific testing of individuals should only be allowed where the em-
ployer has probable cause to believe the employee exhibits specific
impairment directly affecting the work environment, and there is no
other way to ascertain the violation. If the employee refuses the
test, he can not be fired for asserting his rights to privacy. However,
the employer is not hamstrung either. The employer can make a
disciplinary decision on the basis of the observable signs of impair-
ment. The employer does not need a test in order to uphold a ter-
mination for performance related problems.
I would not place any emphasis upon a preannounced inten-
tion of the employer to subject the employee to random testing. No-
tice of the potential for testing is not a sufficient waiver of the right
to privacy since such a waiver conditioned upon the vibranting of a
benefit, namely employment, would be acheived by duress and
would violate public policy.
Granted, drug abuse in our society is a serious problem. How
we choose to deal with that problem may have far-reaching effects
on how we live as a people.
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